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Abstract 
Since 2010, there has been a discernable expansion of global health financing forms using 
private equity, bonds, and ‘facilities’ to finance international development and humanitarian 
endeavors. I present the logics of the Pandemic Emergency Facility (PEF), a World Bank 
device that lashes together a bond, cash, and swaps to lie in reserve for an infectious disease 
outbreak. I explain how the PEF is emblematic of financial devices that have the potential to 
fund global health aid while offering investors a chance to make money. Reckoning with the 
pandemic bond means that we take account not only of the PEF (what does it organize and 
by what logics?) but also of the relationships it cultivates (what does it bind together?) and 
reproduces (what does it aim to multiply and what does it forsake?). I use ‘reckoning with’ as 
an analytic concept to help us think about measures and futures of global health in both 
economic and ethical registers, as well as to take account of how death data is used. Reckoning 
with something lets us pause to take account of where we are and where we are going, and 
helps us think about what we want. Is it necessary to translate the ethical obligation to help 
those who are suffering into financial devices that make people money, a trend we are clearly 
in the initial stages of? Are there conditions when the suffering of others as the source of 
financial speculation becomes desirable? 
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As government funding for public health care becomes increasingly forsaken, and as global 
investors elect to pick up where nation states have left off, practical and ethical questions 
emerge about the mechanisms through which collective health futures will be financed. 
Reckoning with these questions is urgent because new financial mechanisms to fund health 
are being established now, mostly outside of public view. The devices are complex and born 
of multiple and competing interests and perspectives. They force a reckoning: If money for 
pandemic emergency response is not otherwise available, should investors be able to make 
money speculating on pandemics? What does pandemic investability mean for our collective 
health futures?  
As part of my research on the financialization of global health, I reckon with these questions 
through the emergence of the ‘pandemic bond’, which is the money-making part of the World 
Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Facility (PEF), a financial device designed to provide money for 
pandemics. My ethnographic entry point into this bond is the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in 
Sierra Leone, where I have worked for decades.1 My interest in the bond emerged from a first 
 
1  This article is informed by two ethnographic research projects funded by the Social Science and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, the first studying global health data and the second studying 
financialization. The first project began in 2013 with three months of fieldwork in Sierra Leone studying 
the use of health data in humanitarian and commercial endeavors. In 2014, I led an ethnographic 
research team there; three graduate students studying health data in various capacities were involved in 
the project. Each of us conducted participant observation for three months or more; lived in the capital 
city of Sierra Leone, Freetown; and made several trips to smaller cities and towns. All team members 
spoke Krio, the local lingua franca, and some Mende; one member spoke fluent Krio and Mende. The 
study was approved by the Simon Fraser University Research Ethics Board, study number 2012s0643. 
That ethnographic research on health data led me to finance because, in addition to illuminating the 
conventional accountability work that data does in Sierra Leonean global health projects, the project 
also revealed newly emerging financial arenas where health data is being used in new ways. In 2016, a 
new research project was formed from the first, and data was collected from interviews with employees 
of international-development banks, reinsurance corporations, and data-modeling companies, and 
elsewhere. A high degree of anonymization has been preserved. Research for the second project was 
approved by the Simon Fraser University Research Ethics Board, study number 2016s0415. For both 
research projects, there existed no Sierra Leonean in-country ethics review process for social science 
research. In total, the article draws on more than one hundred interviews with Sierra Leoneans and 
others who worked as enumerators, program officers, or owners and managers of government and 
nongovernmental organizations. It is also informed by a previous career in international affairs, during 
which I worked in Sierra Leone and with international-development banks. It is this previous career 
work that facilitated my research access to the interlocutors who inform this article, some of whom are 
quoted.  
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research project, conducted coincidentally at the same time as the Ebola outbreak, in which I 
was ‘following’ health data, which led me to a second project in 2016 to ‘follow the money’.  
The PEF appeared on the global health financial scene in 2017, decades after governments 
around the world chose austerity-driven cutbacks in health care or had them imposed upon 
them, weakening or underbuilding health care infrastructures. The governments of Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, and their respective health care systems, were severely challenged 
when the Ebola virus killed thousands of their citizens from 2013 through 2016. But health 
care response-ability (Haraway 2016) had been circumscribed in those West African nation 
states for decades. Domestic political strife and war had depleted treasuries, making monies 
far less available for health, education, and welfare. The World Trade Organization and 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund also hobbled the implementation of a Sierra Leonean health system and curtailed its 
capacity to respond (Kentikelenis et al. 2015; Zack-Williams 2012; see also Pfeiffer and 
Chapman [2010] for health impacts from structural adjustment and Basu, Carney, and 
Kenworthy [2017] for post-2008 impacts resulting from austerity policies). 
In this context, Jim Yong Kim, a physician, anthropologist, and the then World Bank 
president, promoted the PEF as a response to those failures. In October 2014, Kim began 
publicly advocating for ‘a new pandemic emergency facility’ that would deliver ‘money to 
countries in crisis’ during future disease outbreaks (World Bank 2014a). It was a message he 
repeated three months later at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where he 
won over global financial thought leaders, many of whom had complained for years about the 
aid industry’s inefficiencies. Typically, after a disastrous event, donors pledge funds, but fewer 
than half fulfill their commitments (Grépin 2015). Shifting pandemic emergency response 
from bilateral and donor funding to Wall Street financing is meant to fix a central problem of 
crisis financing: money is unavailable at the optimal time to stop or contain a threat. (‘Wall 
Street’ is meant here in the metonymical sense, inclusive of global-capital market sites where 
people, institutions, and corporations can buy and sell financial instruments to make money.)  
Kim backed the PEF, saying that if it had existed: ‘in 2014 during the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa, we could have mobilized 100 million dollars months before money actually flowed at 
a time when the epidemic was only one tenth as severe. Instead, it cost 10 billion dollars for 
emergency response, recovery efforts and in economic losses to the affected countries’ (World 
Bank 2016b). The next year, in his 2017 American Anthropology Association keynote address, 
Kim (AAA 2017) championed the PEF as a way to ‘insure the poor against pandemics’: ‘We 
went to the capital markets and we actually raised $450 million, now it exists! We have 
pandemic insurance! So the 74 poorest countries in the world, including Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Guinea. … Now when Ebola happens, with the first case, we have a bunch of cash that 
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will go right out to try and stop it. [Audience spontaneously applauds.] Thank you’ (emphasis 
added). 
To be clear, the PEF does not insure poor people per se: it is not health insurance in the 
conventional sense. And despite what Kim said, the PEF money raised in the capital markets 
is not available at the first case of Ebola, or even the 249th. Until the official death count 
reaches 250, no money is released. And even then, there are other criteria to meet. 
In what follows, I explore the pandemic bond portion of the PEF in more detail, but first 
offer some thoughts on the work that ‘reckoning with’ can do when a device like the PEF 
augurs new ethical economies of global health aid. Influenced by Nelson (2009), I use 
‘reckoning with’ as an analytic concept to help think about measures and futures of global 
health in both economic and ethical registers. Reckoning with is a process, a way of taking 
account of where we are and where we are going. It is a pause that gives a chance for the 
unnoticed to be noticed. Reckoning with is not an undoing but rather a reflection in the 
moment. It makes space for some contemplation and understanding before condoning or 
condemning. We can consider: Does this financial device shape a world we want? In this case, 
reckoning with the PEF means considering not only the financial device (what does it organize 
and by what logics?) but also the relationships it cultivates (what does it bind together?) and 
reproduces (what kinds of relationships are strengthened and which are forsaken?). Reckoning 
with the PEF raises Simmelesque questions about the obligations and exchanges between 
people who have much and people who have too little. Reckoning with the means of financial 
and health inequities is important, which brings up a second way I reckon with: I take account 
of the counting, of the global health data that triggers the pandemic bond. Should a poor 
country’s health care failures become sites of wealth speculation and accumulation, which 
would be one way to merge poor people’s right to health with the obligation of wealthy people 
and countries to alleviate suffering? In embracing this new financing, what do societies give 
up? An Economist editorial suggests that the bond ‘means becoming less queasy about putting 
the words “profit” and “human suffering” in the same sentence’ (2017, 68). But the ethical 
heft of what the pandemic bond sets in motion is graver than overcoming an upset stomach. 
The PEF is a harbinger of future global health finance. What do we want to do about that? 
Maybe nothing, maybe something. That’s what ‘reckoning with’ means. 
Governments shaped the public health successes of the last 150 years, but this is changing as 
they draw back under austerity dictates. Before deciding to endorse or denounce the fact of 
the pandemic bond, let’s stay with the trouble (Haraway 2016) long enough to see the world 
in which the privatized securitization of and for healthy futures is used to justify financial 
accounting mechanisms that create interest-bearing bodies (see Baucom 2005). Let’s reckon 
with living in worlds where it may be necessary to translate the ethical obligation to help those 
who are suffering into financial devices that make people money, a trend we are clearly in the 
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initial stages of. One important data point to reckon with: everyone I interviewed who had 
worked to create the PEF – to the person – believed it was a moral good of a high order. So 
let’s consider whether in our current and future worlds investors deserve the ‘right’, as PEF 
advocates phrase it, to potentially make money off other people’s suffering because other 
remedies will not be paid for by governments, by ideological design. Are there conditions in 
which making money from the suffering of others is desirable and should be scaled up? 
What is the PEF? 
With the PEF, the World Bank brings together more than sixty diverse groups to frontload 
money for quick future disbursement if a qualifying pandemic occurs in any of the seventy-
seven International Development Association (IDA) countries, deemed the world’s poorest 
by the World Bank. According to the World Bank (2016a), the PEF will deliver timely, faster, 
and more cost-effective pandemic response; more private-sector money involvement; 
improved transparency and accountability; a strengthening of health systems; and a new 
market. The PEF covers several diseases, including the Lassa and Rift Valley fevers, 
coronaviruses like SARS and MERs, and influenza. Because the pandemic bond covers Ebola, 
a disease that devastated a country whose economy I know well, Ebola is the disease I use as 
a touchstone reference throughout this article. 
To clarify, the Pandemic Emergency Facility is not a facility in any kind of bricks-and-mortar 
sense. And although it is sometimes described as insurance, it’s not insurance in the classic 
sense that a person pays a premium and then receives money to cover losses from an event. 
And despite the fact that most of its money-raising capacity was offered to investors by the 
World Bank as a bond, it is not a conventional or ‘vanilla’ bond. With vanilla bonds, people 
or countries buy in, that is, loan their money for a predetermined duration of the bond, while 
something gets built or funded;. at maturation, a guaranteed principal and interest is paid out. 
Instead, the PEF is a multiaspected, largely speculative financial device – part insurance, part 
bond, part swaps, part cash grant – that is structured by contractual arrangements, many of 
which are legally binding, among the groups involved. These arrangements are detailed in a 
386-page prospectus (World Bank 2017c). 
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Figure 1. The pandemic bond as part of the World Bank’s financial device, the Pandemic Emergency Facility. 
Graphic copyrighted by author. 
 
The PEF works as a container (see figure 1). The World Bank PEF account ‘holds’ donor 
contributions, the pandemic bond, and swaps (an exchange derivative) that total US$450 
million. It also hosts a ‘cash window’ bestowed with a 50-million-euro donation from 
Germany (to which Australia added US$7 million in 2018) and augmented by other World 
Bank money pots on an as-needed basis. Cash-window money can be disbursed on request 
and operates like old-style bilateral aid but with all decisions on payments from the cash 
window made by a PEF Steering Body (World Bank 2019, 3) rather than a country’s 
department of state or ministry of foreign affairs. In this article, I focus on the pandemic bond, 
not the cash pot, because the pandemic bond is a sign and symbol of the big change in 
humanitarian finance, as governments draw down and capital markets rise up to take over 
obligations for human health. Of course, these governments and capital markets are peopled, 
and the social life of the bond is the story I tell here as well.   
For the insurance part of the PEF, the World Bank pays insurance premiums with donated 
money from Germany and Japan to reinsurance companies on behalf of the seventy-seven 
IDA countries covered by the PEF. The reinsurance companies, SwissRe and MunichRe, 
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pocket those premiums paid by the donors. (In the future, the World Bank expects that 
countries facing pandemic threats will find a way to pay their own premiums.) That’s the 
insurance part. The bond part of the PEF launched in July 2017 when twenty-six investors 
bought into a three-year bond designed to raise US$320 million for pandemic response. 
Investors give their money to the World Bank to hold for three years. Some investors paid 
US$250,000, the minimum qualifying amount; some invested US$50 million.  
If there is a pandemic during those three years, the World Bank (2019, 3) gives some of the 
investors’ money to ‘responding agencies’ to administer emergency care: 
PEF funds can be used to finance the cost of response efforts during an outbreak, in 
line with what is described in the country response plan. This includes, but is not 
limited to, deployment of human resources, drugs and medicines, essential and critical 
lifesaving medical equipment (including personal protective equipment), logistics and 
supply chain, non-medical equipment, essential life-saving goods, minor civil works 
(such as setting up temporary care centers), services, transportation, hazard payments, 
communication and coordination, etc. 
There are restrictions: The maximum payout, for example, for filoviruses, of which Ebola is 
one, is capped at US$150 million. Also, PEF funds cannot be used for preparedness: ‘Funds 
will only be made available in times of crises, when countries have been affected by an 
outbreak’ (World Bank 2019, 4). And the standing pre-vetted ‘PEF-accredited responding 
agencies’ have been limited to four: World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). IDA countries and aid organizations can apply to become a 
PEF responding agency by submitting an application. A World Bank–chaired steering 
committee of no more than seven voting and five nonvoting members decide which 
organizations qualify as responding agencies and get PEF funds (World Bank 2017a, 9). 
If there is no pandemic during the three years, the investors get back their money, plus interest. 
If they invested in the higher-risk portion of the bond, they will get back the money they put 
into the bond plus annual interest of about 14 percent.2 If a PEF bond investor invested US$50 
million (there were reportedly such investors), they would receive annual interest of about 
 
2  Over the life of the bond, the rate of interest is variable. Interest, though, is calculated with some 
givens. For example, if an investor bought into the higher-interest bond tranche covering Ebola, 
interest would be calculated like this: 11.5% annually + the USD-LIBOR-BBA 6-month maturity – 
0.40 funding margin. So using the July 2017 USD-LIBOR rate, the annual interest accrued by July 2018 
would be 11.5% + 2.52% – 0.40 = 13.62% (World Bank 2017c, PT-10). 
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US$6.81 million. Over the three-year life of the bond, they would earn about US$20.43 million 
in addition to getting their US$50 million back. An investment of US$50 million becomes 
approximately US$70.5 million in three years if there is no pandemic event.  
Semiannual interest payments are paid to the investors with the money donated by the German 
and Japanese governments, an aspect of the bond’s design that Stein and Sridhar (2017) 
suggest is unsustainable. That donor money, which is earmarked as humanitarian aid, could 
otherwise go directly to pandemic relief. This has prompted criticism about whether the 
money should be given directly as aid, an opinion that has gained some traction in European 
and North American aid circles.   
If you find the PEF’s operational mechanisms confusing so far, it’s not you. The PEF is 
confusing, I found, even to people working in the finance industry. At the World Bank, I met 
people who understood singular ‘silo-ed’ elements of the PEF very well but were not able to 
answer questions about other parts. Part of the problem is that the PEF combines aspects of 
many different financial products, so that a public health expert may not fully understand the 
insurance elements and vice versa. As a financial device, it is clever but also confusing, and I 
was not surprised to learn it took more than two and a half years to design. It had to be made 
up laboriously, combining features of the finance industry with pandemic public health 
measures.  
The design element that took the longest time to create was the payout triggers. Money is 
released (or not) for emergency care depending on the number of confirmed deaths. In the 
event of a future Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, for example, no money from the pandemic 
bond is released for a single case or for any cases up to the 249th. When the 250th death is 
officially counted and other criteria are met, US$45 million becomes available, which is 30 
percent of the money designated for filoviruses, of which Ebola is one. Sixty percent is 
available when 750 deaths are documented. One hundred percent, US$150 million, of the 
bond money designated for filoviruses becomes available when the official count reaches 2,500 
deaths. Other qualifying criteria are written into the bond contract too: no matter how many 
deaths occur within a country, payout is only permitted when cases occur in two bordering 
countries or in a total of eight noncontiguous countries (see table 1). 
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Table 1. World Bank table showing pandemic payout amounts for filoviruses 
 
Source: World Bank (2017a, 7) 
 
Note: 100 percent payouts do not equal the total US$320 million paid in because no single qualifying epidemic 
event (such as Filoviridae viruses like Ebola) can claim all the bond money raised. 
 
Further, as in the recent Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (which 
began 1 August 2018), there is also a ‘growth rate’ threshold, that is, a number and case growth 
calculation, that must be met for the investors’ money to be released (World Bank 2017c, PT-
32). As of this writing, there are more than two thousand confirmed deaths, with a few 
additional deaths over the border in Uganda, but the growth-rate threshold is still being 
analyzed. In later sections, I take up the practices and politics of the death counts, but first I 
provide a genealogy to explain the pandemic bond as a logical outcome of changing 
humanitarian-aid practices.   
The pandemic bond is born: A genealogy  
The World Bank expanded its bond ‘family’ when it issued its pandemic bond in 2017. With 
its first green bond issuance in 2008 and its first catastrophe bond issuance in 2014, World 
Bank–backed bonds have become more complex with each generation. Green bonds work in 
the conventional way of raising money: A bank issues a bond on behalf of, for example, a 
government goal. Investors buy in, and if the goal is met by a certain deadline (the life of the 
bond, usually three to twenty years), the bank, for a fee, pays investors back the money they 
put in and the government pays them interest. During interviews, World Bank economists 
referred to green bonds – designed to build environmentally sound (‘green’) facilities and 
programs – as ‘vanilla bonds’ for their lack of complexity. World Bank officials consider green 
bonds a precursor to the more complex World Bank–issued catastrophe bonds, which in turn 
inspired pandemic bonds. With the issue of the pandemic bond, the World Bank hopes to 
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catalyze a pandemic bond market in the way that the World Bank fostered the development 
of the green and catastrophe bond markets.  
The World Bank is considered at the forefront of ‘innovative financing for development’. But 
it is not alone: the United Nations (2009) has been promoting financial innovation for almost 
a decade, and the Rockefeller Foundation has made a hard push for an ‘innovative finance 
revolution’ (Madsbjerg and Keohane 2016). ‘Advancing universal development goals through 
the breathtaking power of [financial] innovation’ (Nabarro and Schroeder 2016, 100) is a 
concept already well embedded in some international-development and humanitarian-aid 
circles. The Gates and Clinton foundations have advocated financial innovation since about 
2010. In rich and poor countries alike, something was needed to make up for the tax-revenue 
shortfalls in health, education, and social-welfare provisions resulting from the neoliberal 
austerity schematics introduced in the 1980s.  
Market remedies have become the prescriptive fix, ushering in the current era of what is called 
‘impact investing’.3 If investors are willing to risk their money on the chance that their money 
may be lost, the logic goes, then they deserve to make money. Taking on financial risk for the 
public good should be rewarded, according to this view. ‘Paying for success’ has become the 
mantra of impact investing and financial devices known as social impact bonds (SIBs) and 
development impact bonds (DIBs) have proliferated in earnest.  
SIBs got off to a precarious start, beginning with the first one issued in England in 2010. The 
Peterborough Prison SIB did not meet its goal of reducing recidivism, but it set a financial 
precedent nevertheless because the bond device was considered a success. This raises a key 
critique of impact-bond logic: the social goal need not be fully met if the bond device works 
to deliver financial returns to investors.  
The first SIB issued in the United States was launched in 2012 to reduce the number of sixteen-
to-eighteen-year-olds returning to New York City jails within twelve months of their release. 
The goal was to cut recidivism rates through a brief cognitive behavioral therapy intervention. 
Goldman Sachs, who operated as both the bank and the investor, put up US$7.2 million and 
stood to make between US$500,000 and US$2 million if predetermined benchmarks were met 
(City of New York 2012). The therapy program failed, and Goldman Sachs lost some of its 
money (the US$7.2 million loss was reduced to a US$1.2 million loss by a US$6 million backup 
guarantee paid by Bloomberg Philanthropies). The failure of the bond to meet its goals is well 
 
3  Also known as ‘innovative finance’, ‘social finance’, ‘blended finance’, ‘values-based investing’, and 
‘results-based financing’. 
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known among SIB advocates, critics, and fence-straddlers alike (see, for example, Rudd et al. 
2013; Cohen and Zelnick 2015; Dodge 2015, respectively). But the bond device worked as 
designed, and a model was born. Since then, the number of SIBs has grown: as of 2018, there 
were 108 SIBs in twenty-four countries (Rosenberg 2018). Most have not yet come to maturity. 
Development impact bonds (DIBs) followed, applying SIB tenets to international 
development. The first, the Educate Girls Development Impact Bond – a three-year bond 
that raised US$270,000 to improve educational outcomes for girls in Rajasthan, India – was 
launched in 2015 and matured in June 2018. The investor, UBS Optimus Foundation, stood 
to make money even if results fell short (Instiglio4 2015, 15). Projections were that if education 
targets were fully met, the investor would get back its principal investment of US$270,000 plus 
US$89,085. Even if the outcomes met only 86 percent of the projected performance, the 
investor would get an additional US$36,657, a 13 percent return on investment (Instiglio 2015, 
5). The interest payment was paid by the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, a charity 
created by a former hedge fund manager, who would be able to write off the paid interest as 
a tax deduction. 
When the bond was initiated, the investor was speculating on trial outcomes three years in the 
future. Their payout was determined by calculating student-learning outcomes using 
standardized tests in clustered randomized control trials (see table 2). Outcomes would 
eventually trigger the amount of investor return. Putting the debates about standardized testing 
and randomized control trials in education aside, this SIB example highlights how outcome 
data was used to make the investor money, an issue that affects the pandemic bond as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  Instiglio is an NGO headquartered in Columbia that provided the technical design and reporting 
assistance for the Educate Girls Development Impact Bond project in India.  
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Table 2. Educate Girls Development Impact Bond table for calculating learning outcomes 
 
Source: Instiglio (2015, 30) 
 
Results from its first two years suggested that the DIB was unlikely to meet its education and 
inclusion goals fully (IDinsight 2018, 8). But by year three, the Educate Girls Development 
Impact Bond had officially exceeded its enrollment and learning targets. The investor got their 
principal back plus 52 percent interest (US$270,000 + US$144,085 = US$414,085), as was 
directed by the bond contract. But measurement challenges troubled this bond, which comes 
to light in the eleven pages of footnotes and appendixes to the final evaluation report, half of 
the twenty-two-page report (IDinsight 2018). Numerous dubious and debatable decisions 
made by the Working Group5 highlight just how central data is to bond investing. Working 
Group members needed the bond to work as an investment; that is, they needed it to succeed 
in paying out to investors. Decisions about the data reflect this; the data machinations were 
 
5  The bond’s Working Group consists of people from a London-based charitable foundation, a Mumbai 
nongovernmental organization, a Zurich-based multinational investment bank foundation, a Bogota-
based ‘results-based’ financing group, and a New Delhi–based data-analyst group (IDinsight 2018, 2). 
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extensive. Questions about what to do with age-grade dissonance, for example, prompted 
footnotes like this: ‘An 8-year-old child in grade 3 during Year 3 Endline is shown as a 6-year-
old child in grade 1 in this table’ (IDinsight 2018, 16). Debates within the Working Group 
about how to count learning gains inspired this decision: ‘The Working Group agreed to err 
on the side of overestimating learning gains for this group by assuming that the effect of the 
Educate Girls program on students not assessed at Baseline in grade 5 were the same as the 
effect on students assessed at Baseline’ (IDinsight 2018, 19). Some of the descriptions of what 
counts were simply nonsensical. 
Measurement qualifiers, especially in the third year, were copious: ‘Newly-enrolled girls were 
omitted from all analyses’ (IDinsight 2018, 20). Students dropped out. A few schools closed. 
Some schools were dropped by the Working Group. In year three, after years one and two 
were less than promising, the service provider increased remedial tutoring sessions for some 
students to twice a day, along with home visits. The service provider reported spending US$12 
per student per year, when less than US$5 per student was usually spent on students in that 
region (Brookings 2018, 16). The point is not to belittle the measurements but to point out 
that behind the conclusion that ‘DIBs are successful!’ lies sometimes dubious and often 
debatable data-analysis decision making. Serious questions of long-term, population-wide 
applicability and sustainability abound and are cause for concern. For example, who will 
educate students who do not measure up in any given year when investors only pay for 
success?  
There is one more essential precursor in the pandemic bond’s genealogy: the rise of 
catastrophe bonds (called ‘cat bonds’). Introduced in the mid-1990s, cat bonds are bonds of 
one to three years, sold by banks and purchased by private investors willing to ‘hold’ the 
chance that an insurance company will have to pay out claims if a catastrophe happens. 
Investors make money when they hold the bond for an event that does not happen (and that 
insurance companies do not pay out for). Natural disasters like hurricanes, earthquakes, 
wildfires, meteorite impacts, and volcanic eruptions fall into this category of investment 
device. Extreme mortality bonds were introduced in the mid-2000s to protect insurance 
companies against ‘losing too much money’ to life insurance claims in the event of a 
catastrophe. Investors bet on bonds speculating on the where, the magnitude, and the timing 
of the catastrophe.     
 In June 2014, as the Ebola pandemic raged, the World Bank had just issued its first cat bond, 
raising US$30 million, covering earthquakes and cyclones in sixteen Caribbean countries. 
Although the bank was about twenty years late to the party, its new cat bond was hailed as 
‘innovative’ and a ‘milestone’ (World Bank 2014b). The then president of the World Bank Jim 
Kim took credit for putting the two – the Ebola pandemic and the cat bond model – together 
Reckoning with a pandemic bond  
 
 
 
 
 
90 
(AAA 2017). The PEF, with its catastrophe bond–like device and a 50-million-euro cash pot, 
became a signature contribution of Kim’s tenure. 
It is important to reckon with this part of the genealogy: the pandemic bond grew out of a 
neoliberal milieu in which earlier precursors – SIBs, DIBs, catastrophe, and extreme mortality 
bonds – were hailed as the remedy to ‘bad, slow government’. The pandemic bond is a 
manifestation of larger trends away from direct investment in health care systems–
infrastructure and toward pay-for-performance financing (Soucat et al. 2017) and accountable-
care systems (McClellan et al. 2014). Never mind that governments have orchestrated 
astonishing public health improvements over the last 150 years (Rosling 2010): innovative 
global health financing eschews governments, and making money on disease is considered a 
problem-solving ‘win-win’ by many of the people I interviewed.  
At the World Bank, I encountered a widespread embrace of development projects and 
products that provide ‘return’. When I asked my interlocutors there about future 
developments and whether to expect a pandemic bond 2.0, one of them said that the pandemic 
bond 1.0 issuance was a test to see if it functioned as imagined: ‘It’s proof of concept. … It’s 
a pilot and we’ll see how it goes. … [A 2.0] to a large extent, depends on whether the 1.0 
triggers or not. Part of me is like, “I hope there isn’t another public health outbreak with 
pandemic potential”. But another part of me says, “Well, until that happens, we can’t really 
test it”’. In the summer of 2019, the World Bank announced it is working on a PEF 2.0. 
Finance sociality: Relationships strengthened, relationships forsaken 
The development of the bond portion of the PEF was, by many reports, a creative, iterative, 
and exciting process. For some, it was completely nerve-racking. ‘It was my life for two years’, 
a financial analyst said, sounding both proud and exhausted. A core group of officers from 
World Bank departments – Treasury, Health, and Development Finance – developed the bond 
using various exemplars from successful green and catastrophe bond issuances. As the PEF 
developed, the World Bank brought in reinsurance companies, a bond-brokerage company, 
and a data-modeling company to structure the bond.       
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When it came time to solicit investors, the World Bank turned to a familiar bond broker, the 
Guy Carpenter company.6 A cat bond investor told me: ‘[The relationship between the World 
Bank and Guy Carpenter] is a typical kind of investment banking relationship. … [The World 
Bank] needs to turn to some expert who deals with us as investors every day. [Guy Carpenter] 
knows the whole universe of investors who have bought bonds before, what they’re thinking, 
who would care or not care. That’s their value to the World Bank’. 
‘The whole universe of investors’, as it turns out, is a rather stable group of people. No mom-
and-pop investors are allowed. Only institutional investors approved by the US Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) will do. (An SEC-accredited investor has to have earned at least 
US$200,000 in each of the prior two years and have a net worth over US$1 million. Banks, 
partnerships, corporations, nonprofits, and trusts may be accredited investors if their total 
assets exceed US$5 million or if all of the equity owners are SEC-accredited investors [SEC 
2013].) SEC rules specify that an investor must be ‘sophisticated’, meaning that ‘the [investor] 
must have … sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters’ (SEC 
2013, ‘Who Is an Accredited Investor’). During an interview, a World Bank officer mentioned 
‘going on a roadshow’ to look for investors: 
SLE: The roadshow? I’m sorry, but I don’t know what that would mean for the World 
Bank to – ?  
WB: Oh, so that would just mean we went to some cities, you know, to London, Zurich, 
Tokyo, New York, where we spoke with the bond investors and explained to people 
who were potentially interested in investing in this pandemic bond. We explained it to 
them. 
SLE: And at any point did you seek investors or share the model in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, or Guinea? 
 
6  Guy Carpenter is a renowned reinsurance brokerage company, named after its founder. Reinsurance 
companies insure insurance companies so that a single catastrophic event will not bankrupt an 
insurance company; they hold, by some estimates, more than US$600 billion in capital assets (Aon 
2018). In the PEF, Guy Carpenter acted as a facilitator between the World Bank, the reinsurance 
companies, and the investors. 
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WB: No, we have a Steering Committee7 for that. 
From the World Bank’s perspective, the pandemic bond needs to work, and to work it needs 
to draw the ‘right’ kind of attention from the ‘right’ people. This meant getting investor buy-
in from wealthy established capital networks. More than 80 percent of the investors covering 
the Ebola portion of the PEF are in Europe, with dedicated cat bond investors (35 percent) 
and pension funds (42 percent) making up the investor type (Artemis 2018b). Sierra Leoneans, 
Liberians, and Guineans (and people from other qualifying recipient countries) are imagined 
only as the intended recipients of a pandemic payout. They were not consulted in the making 
of the bond. 
In 2016, about fifty senior health and national-security officers from Africa, North America, 
and Europe met near London. Three G7 governments hosted the meeting to share lessons 
learned from the Ebola outbreak. I was invited to explain the financialization of Ebola. After 
I finished explaining how the PEF works as a new form of pandemic financing, a high-ranking 
African officer immediately commented: ‘We’re not in this. I have never heard of this’. That 
officer and others around the room were visibly upset. At issue was the lack of consultation 
with African leaders in the making of the bond. Later, when I joined a lunch table where 
several country officers were eating and discussing the pandemic bond, the general tone had 
shifted to one of resignation. By the end of lunch, I left the table with the impression that 
during a national emergency like the one posed by the West African Ebola outbreak, it did not 
matter much where the money came from. Just that some came.  
But, in a pandemic, is it always the money that matters most? This presumption begs reckoning 
with. Yes, of course, money is absolutely necessary to respond to pandemics. But during the 
Ebola outbreak, nonfinancial factors also severely affected disease containment (see Wilkinson 
and Leach 2014; Shepler 2017), most of which were minimized, in my findings, when 
compared with the World Bank’s aggrandizement of the PEF. And what of the big 
development banks’ responsibilities for economic structuring failures in Sierra Leone, those 
that stunted the growth of a health care system capable of thwarting early cases of Ebola 
(Kentikelenis et al. 2015)? Might the pandemic bond be part of a contemporary impact-bond 
juggernaut that is ‘a dramatic expansion of economic rationality and its penetration into new 
areas of human life’, when best practices like local consultation fall away in pursuit of capital 
(Cooper and Konings 2015, 2)?  
 
7  The Steering Committee consists of up to seven voting members from donor countries (Germany, 
Japan, Australia) and up to seven nonvoting representatives from the World Bank, the World Health 
Organization, Responding Agencies, PEF Eligible Countries, and civil society organizations (World 
Bank 2017b, 15). 
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Making what global health becomes 
Among the people I interviewed, there was a widespread belief that the PEF was a moral good 
and that the financial performance of the pandemic bond would set in motion the future 
conditions of global health. In making the pandemic bond, development banks, reinsurance 
companies, data analysis firms, and investors aim to design anew what the field of global health 
becomes. For centuries, governments unceremoniously – and often unprofitably – held our 
collective disease-security risks, but now we are in an era of private takeover of and profit 
from that obligation. The global financial powerhouses who made the PEF believe the private 
sector should take over government tasks. By their logic, investors who ‘buy’ the risk of a 
pandemic deserve to make money; and they aim to cultivate a pandemic bond market that will 
establish and provide pandemic-response financing in perpetuity. They may be wrong, but 
increasingly they hold the power to shape global health futures to their liking and advantage. 
They design humanitarian devices, structure processes, and determine triggers. They do this 
outside the realms of democratic processes, without constituents constitutionally empowered 
to complain, critique, or improve.  
Reckoning with their imagined global health futures means reckoning with the neoliberal logics 
and metrics that are taking us there. Making the pandemic bond is not only about constructing 
a vehicle in which both investors and pandemic responders share the chance to make money. 
It’s also about constructing another capital market for investors, including the reinsurance 
companies and development banks themselves, to diversify their portfolios. Diversifying 
investment portfolios is a common investment strategy, as different kinds of investments are 
not likely to lose money all at the same time. 
An investor summed up for me the World Bank’s leadership role in the promotion of the 
pandemic bond market: ‘The bond relies heavily on the World Bank. Without their credibility 
and stamp of approval on this, it wouldn’t have been issued. … So it’s very important that 
everyone agree to what the deal is that they’re entering because, god forbid something 
happens, everybody’s got to be on the same page because otherwise the market doesn’t grow’. 
The World Bank understands that the market they are trying to cultivate with the pandemic 
bond is not something found ‘out there’ but rather something that must be painstakingly 
constructed. The bond’s designers aim to catalyze the future conditions of a global health field 
that will be able to rely on capital markets for funding.  
It took two years to develop the PEF bond, and it was created with the hope that it would 
create a new market, a market for transferring the risks of outbreaks and pandemics from 
governments to private investors. Officially, according to the World Bank,  ‘the PEF is 
expected to play a key market development role by helping create a new market for pandemic 
risk insurance. The private sector may take this forward on its own in a few years. … It is likely 
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that over time, as the market matures, the PEF will scale up and pricing will become more 
competitive – as has been seen with catastrophe risk insurance facilities’ (World Bank 2016a, 
iii). The World Bank is counting on the pandemic bond to perform well enough to establish a 
pandemic bond market, much as the green and cat bond markets have over the last ten to 
twenty years. The growth of the green bond market established a solid faith in development 
bonds, but it was the catastrophe bond market – that mechanism for investing in natural and 
climate disasters – that set the sights and expectations for the pandemic bond market. The cat 
bond market took about fifteen years to mature and stabilize. Now it is thriving, valued at 
US$40 billion (Artemis 2019, as of 2 September 2019). Pensions are invested in the cat bond 
market with regularity. An investor pointed out, ‘From the investor perspective, many years 
went by where there wasn’t a loss in the cat bond market, so that helped a lot’. 
If investors regularly lose the money they put into the pandemic bond, the market will cease 
to exist, and the pandemic bond will be considered a market failure. But it is completely 
possible that pandemic bond devices may successfully yield profits that will build a market but 
not correlate to disease containment and improved health outcomes. This is because only the 
data has to meet the contracted measures to profit. Much like Dumit (2012) and Sunder Rajan 
(2012) found with pharmaceutical profiting, well bodies and populations can become 
secondary. In essence, investors do not need to care about disease containment, only about 
the data representing disease containment. And if the pandemic bond performs and makes 
money for investors, that success will spawn other instruments like it and a new market will 
be born.  
Speculative finance is now poised to catalyze what global health becomes. Caring about data 
that supports investor return may not necessarily correlate with well-body outcomes. We need 
to reckon with health data and health care systems that may soon need to be even more 
investor friendly. Many people say we can do both, but let’s interrogate that declaration, 
starting with an examination of how the data that determines returns on the bond actually 
works. 
Reckoning the dead (I of II): Modelling Ebola risk 
If there is a single element that could shake investors’ faith in the pandemic bond and 
undermine a future pandemic bond market, it’s the triggers. The numbers. The assignation of 
financial risk. The counting of the dead. It made sense when a World Bank officer told me: 
‘The investors asked a lot of questions about the data and the veracity of the data and the 
trigger, because for them, that’s what matters the most. … The triggers took the most time to 
set up’.   
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In conversations about the pandemic bond and Ebola, there was a lot of slippage between the 
250, 750, and 2,500 death triggers and the counting of the dead. But they are not the same. 
The triggers work on two registers. This section takes up how risk is defined and assessed by 
modelers and how investors assess their financial risk via the triggers; the next section takes 
account of how the dead are counted (and not counted) relative to the trigger thresholds. 
The pandemic bond’s parametric triggers were assessed relative to the risk of a pandemic for 
investors, that is, the risk that they would lose their money, rather than the risk of pandemic 
for the people who would experience it. Data modelers hired by the World Bank assess this 
risk statistically. They start with retrospective WHO population health data and add data from 
other sources.8 Parametric measures are data points projected for a given population using 
historical inputs and conditions chosen by the data modelers. It is a biostatistical exercise 
employing biostatistical conventions that include sampling and projection.  
What data modelers bring to the project are models that help investors determine how risky 
the bond is, that is, the chance that they will lose their money. This is central to the bond as a 
speculative enterprise. One data modeler explained probabilistic modeling to me this way: 
Data modeler (DM): No one claims that whatever’s presented is 100 percent 
representative of what’s going to happen. That’s why we do five hundred thousand 
years [of probabilistic modeling] because we want to consider all the feasibilities. Some 
things we can’t see, some things that are very severe, some things that are less severe, 
and that’s why we do probabilistic modeling. 
SLE: Five hundred thousand years of modeling?  
DM: Pick January 1 as your start date to December 31. [We model] what could happen 
from a pandemic or a large-scale epidemic or something like that if you resimulate [all 
the variables for a] whole calendar year five hundred thousand times. It’s the same 
thing as if I roll the die five hundred thousand times. You’d have lots of outcomes of 
that. You can run the probabilities many, many, many times until you see convergence 
 
8  Major variables in pandemic bond parametric modeling include: past experiences and exposures to 
disease reservoirs, expected rate of new cases based on past experiences and on seasonality and country 
latitude, estimated rate of transmission based on proportion of susceptible people in population, travel 
rates (air, border crossing, labor migration), expected number of days of disease containment, time to 
scale vaccine production, and fatality rate based on country specifics (industrialized versus 
nonindustrialized, doctors per thousand people, hospital beds). These variables were provided by an 
anonymized data-modeling source. 
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[patterns in the results]. That’s why we selected five hundred thousand times to be able 
to figure out what might happen, based on the historical data and possibilities that we 
have.  
Using the triggers as a guide, investors figured out the chance that they would lose their money 
or make a profit. The risk of death, and therefore of financial loss, is translated into financial 
risk for the investors. Details on this are deep in the fine print of the Prospectus Supplement 
(also called the ‘Term Sheet’) (World Bank 2017c, appendix II).  
Thinking about the triggers as absolute thresholds is misleading, I was told, because they are 
meant more as intermediaries, as modes of thinking about risk. A modeler explained:  
With the outbreak bond, you have the person selling the risk [the World Bank] and the 
person buying the risk [investors]. When we were on the investor roadshow, we were 
not necessarily trying to sell them that the 250 [death trigger] is right or the 750 [death 
trigger] is right. Our objective is to say our model can estimate these various numbers 
with reasonable accuracy. … We operate as this third-party thing, trying to not be 
biased in one’s favor or another. We’re trying to create what we believe is a reasonable 
estimate of the risks. We have to just go with best available data to get there [to set the 
trigger].  
Like the making of a market, establishing a parametric trigger takes serious effort. The modeler 
continued: 
The parametric model is kind of a weird structure. You could do a myriad of different 
ways that the structuring can get made, and our objective is to give [the World Bank] 
quantifiable risk against a lot of different assessments. When they ask a question, we 
might provide just that one: ‘Oh, you asked about A, here’s the risk’. Or we might do 
a few different things and say, ‘Here’s a few options based on what you said’. Or they 
might sometimes just say, ‘Before we do A and B, have at it and figure something out 
for us’, and then we’ll come up with an option, and then they’ll look at it and then be 
like, ‘We wanted to do some more stuff around it’, then you do that kind of stuff. So 
it’s this back-and-forth process. 
Another modeler joked, ‘All the models are wrong, but some of them are useful’.  
In the end, data modelers used their pandemic-risk model to help write conditions that were 
not likely to result in too much investor loss. The World Bank’s (2017a, 6) Operations Manual 
lists these conditions, which need to be met before investors lose their money in an Ebola 
outbreak event.  
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• At least 12 weeks have passed from the start date of the event.  
• The outbreak is in more than one country, with each country having greater than 
or equal to 20 Confirmed Deaths. 
• The Growth Rate of disease needs to be greater than zero to ensure that the 
outbreak is growing at a specific statistical confidence level.  
• The Total Confirmed Death Amount needs to be greater than or equal to 250. 
• The Rolling Total Case Amount needs to be greater than or equal to 250. 
• The Rolling Confirmed Case Amount needs to comprise a minimum percentage of 
the Rolling Total Case Amount.  
• Regional outbreaks affecting two to seven countries would activate payments at 
three stages as the number of total confirmed deaths increases. Global outbreaks 
affecting eight or more countries also activate payments at three stages, but at 
higher funding levels at the first two triggers.  
In talk about the pandemic bond as a financial device, there is regular and unself-conscious 
slippage between risk to investors and risk to people who are likely to experience the disease. 
Many people I interviewed talked about the two kinds of risk as if they were one and the same, 
when of course they are not. A deep reckoning with the pandemic bond forces an essential 
confrontation: for some people, the stakes are about losing or gaining money; for others, the 
risks are death or long-term disability. The numeric triggers obscure that difference, thereby 
creating another risk: losing sight of which risks to prioritize. 
Reckoning the dead (II of II): Taking account of the counts  
In World Bank documents, investor synopses, and bond blogs, the numeric triggers of the 
pandemic bond (table 1) are characterized as clear-cut and uninfluenced: ‘Parametric [health] 
triggers use publicly available and observable data to determine the payment amounts. As these 
triggers are based on observable data, they provide more transparency, increase the speed of 
payment and allow for an objective benchmarking of risk. … Bonds would be constructed 
around the same transparent and indisputable activation criteria’ (World Bank 2016a, 13–14). 
What is striking in conversations about the pandemic bond with reinsurance, data-modeling, 
and finance personnel is the enduring faith they place in the triggers. Even when data limits 
are acknowledged, the prevailing sentiment was: ‘they’re the best we’ve got, and we’ve got to 
use something’. Counting the dead is beset by a similar sensibility. The pandemic bond uses 
counts published in WHO Disease Outbreak News or Situation Report, and there is faith in that 
data. When I interviewed one World Bank manager of the bond, I found that my knowledge 
of data collection in Sierra Leone was more granular than theirs:  
WB: It’s data that WHO puts out. … WHO puts out those numbers in the moment. 
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SLE: By the month, or – 
WB: No, they take it in real-time. You should talk with the health team because they’re 
the ones who gave us the assurance that WHO is doing this really in real-time. 
SLE: Thank you, yes, I’ll follow up. In my research, though, I travel around with the 
people who collect the numbers for WHO. … I mean, I know the guys who collect 
the numbers in Sierra Leone. 
WB: Okay. Alright. Well. … I’m a third-party receiver of the numbers. I don’t know 
whether it is a suspected case or a probable case or a confirmed case. I don’t track that. 
That’s not my job. It is WHO’s job, so we entrusted them with that responsibility. That 
is the data that we go on. … There was sufficient comfort, you know, in the data the 
WHO provides. 
During research in Sierra Leone in 2014, our team collected ethnographic data on how health 
data is generated. In Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone, and in small cities in the eastern 
and northern provinces, we met with, interviewed, and observed the work of people involved 
with health-data generation. In the process, we learned that Sierra Leonean freelance 
enumerators are the most significant group of data collectors in the country. A cohort of 
mostly men and a few women in their twenties and thirties, these enumerators work on short-
term contractual bases for any organization that ‘needs numbers’. For example, an enumerator 
is hired to collect data in twenty villages from people who suffer from a disease. Their job is 
to travel to these villages in, for example, two weeks’ time, collect disease data, and usually fill 
in a survey on a smart phone or tablet. That may sound straightforward, but in actual practice 
it is not. It’s precarious wage labor, complicated by language – in Sierra Leone there are about 
twenty different languages spoken in an area the size of Scotland – and further by work 
schedules often put together by people who have never been to Sierra Leone or driven on its 
roads (see images in figure 2). Nor do they understand the precarious rhythms of labor and 
labor mobility during the dry and rainy seasons. Collecting health data in Sierra Leone is 
physically and socially demanding work, and during an epidemic, be it cholera, measles, or, 
Ebola, even more so. One enumerator described the challenge: ‘The last time I went to 
Kailahun district [a region where the early Ebola outbreak occurred] I walked twenty-one miles 
to go to a village and twenty-one miles to come back. When you go to the field, your very first 
problem is how far it is. … Just imagine walking twenty-one miles to go and twenty-one to 
come back, and you have four villages to cover!’ Another Sierra Leonean enumerator 
mentioned similarly, ‘Enumerators have to go through frightful and dangerous roads. There 
is water, bridges, and bush paths in forests. Dangerous!’ 
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Figure 2. Rural bridges and roads in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 2013. Left-hand photograph by J. B. Dodane, 
right-hand photograph by Travis Lupik, both used with permission. 
 
To enhance data security, employers track enumerators via the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) in their phones. There is not always enough time to complete all the villages assigned 
and do all the paperwork. One enumerator’s statement summarizes what several others also 
said: ‘I have heard that sometimes people will send their smart phones with lorry or motorcycle 
drivers to a village, while they fill out the questionnaire, because there is just not enough time 
to do everything they want’. (See also Kingori and Gerrets [2016] and Biruk [2018] on the 
moralities and realities of data fabrication by fieldworkers.) But there are risks to this strategy, 
as noted by another enumerator: 
The last time I went, [the WHO-contracted NGO] gave us PDAs [later, smart phones] 
to know if we went to the communities. They knew the GPS [Global Positioning 
System] coordinates of the village, so now you have the questionnaire and also a GPS. 
Now they detect you. ... If they detect that you have not gone, they will send you back 
there. And maybe charge you with the full punishment of the law for giving them 
wrong information. They will retrieve your money they paid you.  
Certainty about the health data down to the last digit is not possible. Investors potentially will 
lose money when the official data show 250 people dead; responding agencies and countries 
potentially get money for the same. Yet 249 deaths yield dramatically different results. People 
on both sides of the ledger are hedging their bets. Ministry officials in Sierra Leone have told 
me that they need ‘bad numbers’ to get foreign assistance. I found in earlier research that one 
of the ways they accomplish this is by not collecting health data from clinics known for their 
good outcomes. On the investor side, deflating death-rate data would be as easy as hiring 
enumerators for more lucrative work, thereby delaying data collection, or hacking into smart 
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phones to alter data. There are many creative ways to play with data triggers, if that’s what 
stands between money for investors or money for receiving countries.  
So much money is riding on the counts that I too must reckon with the potential impacts of 
my research. An investor told me, ‘If the event happens and investors feel like it wasn’t fairly 
calculated or there was some monkey business going on, then the market isn’t going to be 
around for long’. My work pulls back the curtain to show how the data is collected, counted, 
analyzed, and applied. Will the real-time wobbliness of the data deter potential investors? Will 
it derail the PEF? Maybe. In the investor worlds I entered, though, I found that investors are 
mostly agnostic. They go where the money is to be made. If not with pandemic bonds 1.0, 
then maybe with 2.0 or 3.0. Or they will go elsewhere completely. This is another risk to reckon 
with: in a possible future where pandemic risk management has been turned over to capital 
markets after government aid drops to historic lows, how will pandemics be funded if 
investors flee?   
Insuring futures: Whose?  
For some time now, the performance and even the viability of the World Bank has been in 
question. No friend of the Bank, the Financial Times regularly questions its relevance (see, for 
example, Financial Times 2014), along with other powerful North American and European 
international-development and finance establishments. The development economist Jeffery 
Sachs (2012) argues that the World Bank ‘has lacked a clear direction’, ‘solved far too few 
global problems’, and ‘completely fumbled the exploding pandemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, 
and malaria during the 1990s’. In a more recent article, in which he took a direct swipe at the 
World Bank’s Wall Street and Davos leanings, Sachs (2018) pointedly praised funding that 
used ‘outright grants, not Wall Street loans. Fighting AIDS in poor countries was not viewed 
as a revenue-generating investment needing fancy financial engineering’. Likewise, an article 
in the New York Times explored the link between the World Bank’s organizational viability and 
private-investor profit: ‘In a search for relevance, the bank’s president is altering its approach. 
… He is pushing private investors – sovereign wealth funds, private equity firms and insurance 
companies – to pony up trillions of dollars for projects. … They can reap rich returns by 
putting their money to work alongside the World Bank’ (Thomas 2018). 
Reckoning with the pandemic bond means sorting out who has what to gain from its success 
as a financial device. In early 2015, the World Bank invited ‘some of the largest reinsurance 
companies in the world’ to help build the pandemic bond, a World Bank interlocutor told me: 
Several [reinsurance companies] expressed interest, and we had conversations with 
them. But then, ultimately, they started dropping out. I mean, at that time, we didn’t 
know what the PEF would look like. But we said we were interested in partnering with 
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the private sector to put together some sort of mechanism that will help insure 
countries against the next disease. Ultimately, there were just two that remained 
interested. They had some comfort in working with the bank because they also worked 
with the bank on the cat bonds. 
I was told that the World Bank paid out about US$1 million to build the pandemic bond, and 
that the reinsurance companies9 worked pro bono because they were very interested in 
developing the pandemic bond instrument. Since the 2017 PEF bond initial offering, they 
have already made US$37 million per year on PEF bond premiums. One economist told me 
that the reinsurance companies involved in the PEF ‘are expecting to make over $100 million’ 
on the pandemic bond premiums alone. They have a lot more to gain financially if a pandemic 
bond market becomes established along the lines of the green and cat bond models. Reinsurers 
were in it to develop and influence a market that they would be able later to invest in. Their 
financial security and profit depend on them being able to diversify their own portfolios and 
spread around their own risk, much as they have done in the cat bond market. A reinsurance 
executive bluntly explained that just making the pandemic bond alone would not have been 
worth it: ‘The amount of effort that we [the reinsurance company structuring the pandemic 
bond] had to invest into it, it was [a] very long and intensive time of work with many, many 
experts involved, lots of discussions going on. It’s only worth it against the hope that this 
effort would create a new market. Otherwise the costs involved in developing these types of 
solutions would be too high’. 
But a well-known European economist familiar with the pandemic bond’s mechanics put the 
reinsurance companies’ interest in a different light: ‘It really doesn’t make much sense when 
the world’s resources for health care for people in poor countries are very scarce. So, adopting 
the design where half the money, on average, goes to an insurance company is kind of crazy’. 
Dead reckoning 
Dead reckoning is a navigational method that uses known plot points to set a direction 
(Blowditch 2002). It is an apt metaphor for anticipating whether pandemic bonds will establish 
and continue. What has the pandemic bond launched? Is turning back possible? Given the 
years in the making, the socialities between the World Bank, the bond brokers, the donor 
 
9  Reinsurance companies sell insurance to insurance companies. When a hurricane hits and thousands 
of homeowners file claims, for example, reinsurance companies pay out to the insurance companies 
who might otherwise go bankrupt. They hold by some estimates more than US$600 billion of capital 
assets (Aon 2018), which is one of the reasons the World Bank wanted them involved in the pandemic 
bond arrangements. 
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countries, and the reinsurance and data companies, and these parties’ investments of time and 
money, and all the favors asked, all the chits called in, and all the objections overcome to make 
the device, to set the stage for a new market, to get the job done, I ask: Is the future of 
pandemic response aid open? Or do the creation and the processes of the pandemic bond 
foreclose alternatives? Could pandemic security be returned to governments? Is it stubborn 
naïveté to continue to imagine worlds where investments in good government produce less 
financially motivated care? Could the bond as a global health finance device ever fail 
completely, given that there is so much from the so powerful at stake? Is there an equivalent 
here to ‘too big to fail’ (too much time spent, too many favors, too many promises, too many 
concessions, too much exchange)? Can any level of reckoning undo the bond making (double 
entendre intended) of the pandemic bond?  
The ethical stakes of this reckoning ratcheted up a notch when the World Bank invited the 
reinsurance industry to the pandemic bond design process. The insurance industry’s role in 
Black Atlantic capitalism in the eighteenth century and its production of ‘interest-bearing 
bodies’ is instructive. Baucom (2005) tells of a British merchant vessel, the Zong, that sailed the 
Atlantic Ocean in 1781 en route to Jamaica, with 440 West Africans who would be sold as 
slaves in Caribbean slave markets. The ship went off course, extending the voyage. Food and 
water ran low. To compensate – and knowing he could claim insurance for lost ‘cargo’ – the 
captain directed that 132 men, women, and children from West Africa be thrown overboard, 
a premeditated mass murder at sea. When the ship arrived in Jamaica, its captain and owners 
claimed loss of insured property, at £30 per person. The insurers refused to pay; the captain 
and owner sued. The insurers were ordered to pay. The case was taken for appeal in a higher 
court, whose chief justice was intent on building England’s economy through his insurance 
law project (Krikler 2007, 35). The judge had found English commercial law ‘inadequate to 
the task of improving the efficiency of a burgeoning capitalism and ensuring the security of 
property and the integrity of business transactions’, including the slave trade (Krikler 2007, 
42). Eschewing murder charges, the judge upheld the insurance contract. By the late eighteenth 
century, British insurance companies were insuring marine contracts, including covering ships 
carrying enslaved Africans, worth around £100,000,000 a year, which would be billions of 
pounds today (Krikler 2007, 32). Britain’s shipping industry and navy are widely considered 
essential to England’s nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century capital accumulation and 
domination. The association between insurance and profit-for-some – who uses insurance for 
what, why, and how much – is a historied and racist one.  
When I learned of the 2018 Ebola outbreak in the DRC, my involuntary first thought was of 
the number dead and whether the pandemic bond had been triggered for aid. I checked the 
numbers; the death data hadn’t triggered the bond. Investors did not lose their money. Two 
weeks after the first Ebola cases in the DRC were confirmed, the PEF cash-pot mechanism, 
not the pandemic bond, kicked in. In May 2018, US$12 million from the cash pot was 
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disbursed. The World Bank congratulated itself for moving the dial away from panic and 
neglect (Evans 2018). It took credit for the money being there, at the ready. Another US$20 
million was disbursed in February 2019; US$10 million more was disbursed in May 2019. 
Deaths mounted, but no matter how many people die in a single country, the pandemic bond 
money cannot contractually be released as aid until the disease crosses the country’s border. 
A colleague wrote to me, ‘Saw the PEF numbers are at trigger level but still waiting for the 
border jump. What a bizarre and twisted situation!’ Then in June 2019, Ebola was confirmed 
in Uganda. But for the bond to trigger, there are still more conditions: there must be at least 
twenty deaths and the growth-rate threshold must be met. In August 2019, US$300 million 
was released for Ebola care from the cash window and other World Bank accounts. Two 
thousand dead, and still the bond did not trigger.  
I continue to track the death data from the DRC outbreak, and reckon with the role of the 
data just as I continue to reckon with the bond. I am skeptical. I am not there in the Congo. I 
do not know if more people may have died only to elude count. I am not privy to the 
conversations in the ministries or to the whisperings of community members. I am not 
hanging out with the enumerators. Do they have gasoline for their motorcycles? Are they 
allowed into villages where people are dying from Ebola? What kind of data-collection 
schedules are they on? And then I catch myself. The death data is both the mainstage and the 
sideshow in the PEF schematic. Splitting off data from the actual health of populations is 
normal practice now (Erikson 2012), and care need not even be delivered for a financial device 
to ‘succeed’. Counting the dead has long been a political act of states, and now it is becoming 
a special interest of global financiers.  
Are pandemic and development impact bonds the future of global health and humanitarian 
aid? All things considered, maybe they are. And if they are, let’s prepare and reckon with how 
we as a global community will pay for care during pandemics and other crisis events if investors 
flee and governments can’t or won’t pay. Is this the future we want? Let’s reckon with this 
now before the global health bond slot becomes a financial juggernaut, government coffers 
atrophy further, and pandemic problem solving becomes more circumscribed. 
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